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NOTES
THE KENTUCKY JUDICIAL COUNCIL
In yet another matter Kentucky has joined the ranks of
progress and in so doing has become the fourteenth state to
provide for a continuous, systematic study of the administration
of justice by an organized agency, namely, the Kentucky Judicial
Council. The Act creating the council was passed by the 1928
legislature,1 and has been more recently sustained in a test case
before the Court of Appeals. 2 Regardless of the constitutional
technicalities involved, the decision upholding the measure's
validity clearly seems a sound one.
Indeed there has already been one meeting of the Council.
At the call of the Chief Justice of the Court of Appeals, the
Council held its first meeting on December 27, 1928, and perfected matters of organization and adopted by-laws. According
to the provisions of these latter the body will meet henceforth
at Frankfort on Thursday of the first week of the April recess
of the Court of Appeals and Thursday of the second week of
November.
While the Kentucky Judicial Council as constituted and empowered at present is unquestionably a step in the right direction, there are several features which might be improved by a
comparative study of the experience of the other thirteen states
along similar lines, as well as the experience of the Federal
Council of Senior Circuit Judges, which was the forerunner
of most of the state councils, and the English Rule Committee,
which in turn furnished the basic concept for all of the above
mentioned bodies. The English Rule Committee was originally
constituted under the Judicature Act of 1875, while the Federal Council of Senior Circuit Judges was formed by Congress
in 1922. The thirteen states which had adopted the Judicial
council idea in some one of its several variations previous to
'Kentucky Acts, 1928, c. 20, p. 145; Baldwin's 1928 Supplement to
Carroll's Kentucky Statutes, sec. 1126a-1.
-Coleman, Auditor v. Hurst, 11 S. W. (2d) 133 (decided November
27, 1928).

KENTUCKy LAW JouRNAL

Kentucky's adoption and the dates of adoption are, respectively: Wisconsin, 1913 ;5 New Jersey, 1915 ;4 Ohio 5 and Oregon, 6
1923; Massachusetts, 1924;7 Washingtons and North Carolina, 9
12
1925; California, 1926;1o North Dakota, 1 Connecticut,
3
14
Kansas,' and Rhode Island, 1927; and Virginia, 1928.15 At
the present time there is agitation for enactment of similar legislation in a number of other states, notably Texas, Michigan,
Pennsylvania, and Missouri.'8
It is believed that a critical study of the Act creating the
Kentucky Judicial, Council together with a-comparative study
of the legislation and experience of these other states may
prove quite worthwhile. The Act could easily be amended
should this prove necessary, as indeed it has proved necessary
in at least one other state, namely, Oregon. Therefore it -is
the purpose of this note to furnish the framework for such a
study. To this end let us consider the various matter under
the-following heads: Personnel, Power and Duties, Compensation and Expenses.
2Wis.
Stats. 1913, s. 113.08. See comment as to present status and
powers Wis. Stats. (1927), p. 3108.
IN. J. Laws 1915, c. 93, p. 147.

5

Ohio Laws 1923, p. 364. Text of Act may also be found in 21

Ohio Law Bulletin 241-243.
6Oregon Laws 1923, c. 149, p. 211. Text of Act may also be found
in 7 Journal American Judicature Society 85-86. The Oregon statute.
was amended In 1925, L. 1925, c. 164, p. 244.
' Mass. Acts and Resolves 1924, c. 244, p. 228. Text of Act also
found in 9-Massachusetts-Law Quarterly 88-89 and in 8 Journal American Judicature Society 245-246.
'Wash. Laws 1925, c. 45, p. 38. Text of Act also found in 9
Journal American Judicature Society 102-103.
0Public Laws of N. C. 1925, c. 244. Text of Acts also found in 9
Journal American Judicature Society 15-17.
1 Calif. Laws 1925, c. 48, p. 1369. Adopted by people" as a constitutional amendment, Laws 1926, LXXXVIII. Text of Amendment also
found in 11 Journal American Judicature Society 15-17.
IN. D. Laws 1927, c. 187, p. 243.
"Found in 11 Journal American Judicature Society 8.
"Kan. Laws 1927, c. 187, p. 243. Text of Act also found in 13
American Bar Association Journal 275.
11R. I. Laws 1927, c. 1038, p. 224-225. Text Qf Act also found in 11
Journal American Judicature Society 117.
"Acts of Virginia Assembly 1928, c. 7, p. 6.
"See the discussion in the following law periodicals: 6 Texas Law
Review 468-470; 6 Michigan State Bar Journal 201; 9 Journal American
Judicature Society 77-79; and 28 Law Series Missouri Bulletin 47. For
the situation in Missouri especially, as well as the situation in several
additional states see C. H. Paul, The Growth of the Judicial Council
Movement, 10 Minnesota Law Review 85-89.

TnE KENucKY JUDIcIAL CoUNCmI
PERSONNEL

As far as the matter of personnel is concerned the Kentucky Judicial Council may well be studied from two distinct
angles, namely, from the standpoint of the quantity and the
quality, respectively, of its constituent membership. The Kentucky Council is composed of all of the Judges of the Court
of Appeals and all of the Circuit Judges of the State-a total
of forty-four. Is this not too cumbersome and unwieldy a body?
The English. Rule Committee is composed of twelve, while the
Federal Council of Senior Circuit Judges has ten members, including the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court. Most of the
state councils have an even lesser number of members. Oregon
has five members, Rhode Island seven, New Jersey, Kansas and
Connecticut eight, Massachusetts, Washington and Ohio nine,
California eleven, and Virginia has a maximum membership of
sixteen and a minimum of fourteen. Only North Dakota and
North Carolina have~a larger personnel than does Kentucky; the
former has fifty members, while the latter has approximately
the same number. These two states, as well as Wisconsin, have
adopted a variation of the original judicial council plan and
include all of the more important judges of thxe state in the
council's membership. Apparently it is after this fashion
that the Kentucky plan is drawn. Yet the reports issued by
the various councils to date would indicate that by far the more
satisfactory results are being obtained from the smaller councils. Commenting on the North Carolina situation the North
Carolina Law Review has said: "... This body of fifty men is
u7
much too large for effective administration.' "
In the matter of quality there is one outstanding defect
in the Kentucky Council as now constituted: No lawyers are
included among its personnel. Ten of the other thirteen states
have had the wisdom to include the Bar as well as the Bench
in the deliberations. A majority of these provide that the Bar
shall be represented by a number almost equal to that of the
Bench-a representation which varies from three to ten in
number. The lawyer members may either be appointed by
the governor of the state, as some of the statutes provide, or
they. may be named by the state bar association, as in other
'4 North Carolina Law Review 40.

KENTUCKY LAW JouRNAL
states. It seems that a combination of these two methods of
selection might prove happy. Only California, Oregon and
Wisconsin have failed to include lawyers. Even in a state
whose council is modelled after the Kentucky plan it is feasible
to include the Bar, as North Carolina has so clearly shown.
Several states provide that the attorney-general shall be a
member, while others provide that at least one prosecuting attorney be included. Still others require that membors of the
legislature shall be included, while a single state, North Dakota,
has the unique, though wise, provision that the dean of the
State University Law School be a member. Massachusetts has
devised a scheme which has proved a happy one and which has
been copied in Connecticut and Rhode Island, namely, that
former justices of the supreme judicial court be eligible for
membership upon appointment by the chief justice. In this
way Massachusetts has been able to command the services of
so able a lawyer as the former Justice Loring.
The experience of the English as to the advisability of
naming lawyers on their Rule Committee may be of value to
us at this point. The Judicature Act of 1875 left the rulemaking power in a sort of general council of the Bench. But
this has been changed several times and as early as 1894 practicing attorneys were added. At present four of the twelve persons composing the Rule Committee must be lawyers, two barristers and two solicitors. These are representatives of the Bar
and Law Council, respectively.' 8 Professor Sunderland has
summed up the policy underlying the inclusion of lawyers in
all such deliberations when he said: "Lawyers and judges are
both officers of the court, and both must participate in any
successful formulation of rules for the administration of justice."' 19 There is the added fact that most of our judges are
already overloaded with duties and really do not have the time
necessary for these additional burdens.
'sRosenbaum, The Rule Committee,
(Reprinted from his book,
Rule Making Authority in the English Supreme Court). 5 Massachusetts Law Quarterly 240.
" Sunderland, The Exercise of the Rule Making Power, 12 American Bar Association Journal 548, 552.

THE KENTucKY JuDICIAL COUNCI
PowERs AND DuTIEs

In England, of course, the Rule Committee, which is the
forerunner of the judicial council idea, has, as its name indicates, power to make rules of court. In the United States, on
the other hand, the judicial council has always been, with one
notable exception, an advisory body. The reason for this is
largely traceable to the history of the Federal Council of Senior
Circuit Judges, the story of which is quite interesting. In 1922
there was, as there has been for some time, considerable agitation for legislation giving the United States Supreme Court
the rule-making power on the law side as it has had for some
years on the equity side. As Congress delayed action on the
several bills which would have conferred this power, the bill
establishing the council of judges was introduced as a sort of
compromise to tide over special exigencies, and was promptly
passed.20 It bore the approval of Chief Justice Taft, who has
ever been an ardent advocate of judicial council legislation.
And of course under the circumstances this council of federal
judges was given only advisory powers as have most of the
subsequently created state councils.
This feature is to be regretted. The judicial council should
properly be more than an advisory body. The movement as
originally conceived was intimately related to the rule-making
power, 2 1 and there is every reason why it should continue so;
these two principles should be combined in the United States
as they are in all parts of the British Empire.
California alone has chosen to give her judicial council
more or less plenary rule-making powers. The council has
power "to adopt or amend rules of practice and procedure for
the several courts not inconsistent with laws that are now or
that may hereafter be in force.''22 And it is worthy of note
that the California Council has been conspicuously effective
'1 8 Journal American Judicature Society 174.
'See The Intimate Relationship between Movements for Judicial
Councils and Rule-Making Power, 10 Journal American Judicature Society 99.
"This was accomplished in California by a constitutional amendment. Laws of 1926 LXXXVIII. It is interesting to note that the
constitutional amendment, when submitted to the people for ratification, polled about a two to one majority of the votes. 11 Journal
American Judicature Society 9.
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for already it has been instrumental in cutting down the "waiting period" in litigation from nearly two years to three
months. 23 One feature of the California measure which was
modelled after the Federal plan has been of especial help in
accomplishing so noteworthy a result, namely, the council has
control over the assignment of judges to relieve emergency situations due to crowded court calendars. It is possible that the
Kentucky council may work out a variation of this plan which
may suit the particular needs better. At the first meeting of
the council Judge Henry R. Prewitt asserted that circuit
judges of the State are not doing enough of the special judges'
work.
Possibly we should add that the Wisconsin Board of Circuit
Judges, which is the variation of the judicial council obtaining
in that State, has very limited rule-making powers. It may
make rules for the circuit courts not inconsistent with statutes
or with rules of practice adopted by the supreme court. By
virtue of this power the Board has adopted several sets of
rules.2 4 However, the leading authorities on procedural reform agree that the ideal way is to give the judicial council
much more extensive rule-making powers, and consequently
the American Judicature Society has drawn up a model Act
which combines in a single instrument the judicial council idea
and the rule-making power.25
Even those states which have not given the council rulemaking powers and which have confined it to a purely advisory
capacity have, however, more satisfactory provisions for the
rule feature than does Kentucky. Apparently each of the
other states has a provision that the council shall submit such
suggestions as it may deem advisable for the consideration of
the judges of the various courts with relation to rules of practice and procedure. To be sure there is the provision in the
Kentucky Act that the council shall "study the organization,
rules, methods -of procedure, and practice of the judicial system -of the Commonwealth," but its only report is to be to the
legislature. -Probably the explanation is that any further stress
2Grant, The Judicial Council Movement, 22 American Political
Science Review, November, 1928, pp. 936-946.
-"Thelatest rules may be found In Wis. Stats. (1927), p. 3147.
6 Journal American Judicature Society, No. 4.
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on rules of court was considered unnecessary since all of the
principal judges of the State are members of the council.
To show the close connection between the judicial council
and the rule-making power we may note that eight of the fourteen states having judicial councils have also given to the courts
a more or less plenary rule-making power. These states are:
Wisconsin, New Jersey, Washington, North Carolina, California, North Dakota, Connecticut and Virginia. In a ninth
state, Oregon, the judicial council has proposed recently an
amendment to the constitution which would confer on the supreme court of the state the complete power to make rules for
all of the courts of record of the state.20 It is probable that the
same object could be accomplished in Kentucky without a constitutional amendment and by an appropriate statute, as in
most of the other states which have returned the power to control procedural details to the courts. Surely the Kentucky
Council could give itself to no more, worthy endeavor than the
restoration of the rule power to the courts. The code system
of regulating procedure is all too ineffective when it attempts
to regulate all of the minute details of procedure-details which
are more properly the subject of the rule-making power. All
of the good which has been accomplished by the Code could
well be saved in a short practice act, such as the one which has
supplanted the Code in New York, supplemented by rules of
court. Even the fither of the Codes, David Dudley Field,
recognized the superiority of this latter system, for he said in
1891: "In one respect the English Act (JudicatuireAct of 1875)
has an advantage over the American (Code), in that it is shorter,
numbering only 100 sections or articles, intended to be supplemented, as it was supplemented, by rules of court. "27 Well
might the Kentucky Judicial Council undertake the task of
overhauling the Kentucky Code along modern lines.
As to most of the other provisions about the powers and
duties of the council, the Kentucky Act does not differ greatly
from other statutes. It provides that: "It shall be the duty
of each Circuit Judge to prepare and submit to the Council
"°Ridgeway, The Oregon Judicial Council and the Rule-Making
Power, 4 Oregon Law Review 293.
2' David Dudley Field, Law Reform in the United States and Its
Influence Abroad, 25 American Law Review 525.
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at such sessions a report setting forth the conditions in the
Circuit Court over which he presides and of the business dispatched and pending in said Circuit Court. It shall be the duty
of said council to report biennially to the General Assembly
of the Commonwealth of Kentucky concerning the work of the
various branches of the judicial system of the Commonwealth
together with any recommendations it may have for the modification"or amelioration of existing conditions or for any amendments to the Codes of Practice and Procedure." A majority
of the statutes give the council the power to compel the attendance of witnesses and the production of necessary papers, a
thing which the Kentucky Act does not provide.
COMPENSATION AND EXPENSES

The Kentucky Act is absolutely the only -statute which
provides that the members of the judicial council shall receive
pdy; all of the others providing that members shall serve without compensation other than expenses. Each member of the
Kentucky council is to receive six hundred dollars a year, payable in equal monthly installments. The other statutes merely
provide that the traveling expenses and other incidental expenses of the members shall be paid. The first Oregon statute
did not even provide for expenses, but this proved ineffective,
so the statute was amended to allow expenses. 28 It is difficult
to say whether the Kentucky innovation is a wise one or not,
but suffice it to say that it is a departure from the conventional
29
idea.
Let no one mistake the advantage and sigiiificance of the
Kentucky Judicial Council even as the matter stands. It can.not but accomplish great good. Yet this is no reason why it
should not be made even better-better in each and every one
of its outstanding aspects and especially in the matters of personnel and power. All Kentuckians may look forward with
confidence to the accomplishment of many things by the council. Judging from the experience of other states we can safely
predict the following achievements for the organization:
Oregon Laws 1925, c. 164, p. 244.
See Paul, The Growth of the Judicial Council Movement, 10 Minnesota Law Review 85, 97.

THE KENTUCKY JUDICIAL COUNCIL
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)

Unification of
Simplification
A continuous,
Prevention of

the State's judiciary;
of procedure;
systematic, scientific survey;
ill-advised legislation.

To put the matter in summary fashion we may hope that
the Kentucky Judicial Council, in a measure at least, lives up
to the picture of the situation created by its English prototype,
as, portrayed by Professor Sunderland: "By the creation of
the Rule Committee, responsibility, previously scattered, was
localized through the addition of active members of the practicing bar, a broader outlook was obtained, and better contacts
were established with the commercial communities and with
the public generally. These measures obviously promote efficiency and have been adopted in other parts of the British
Empire.' '30 May they soon have spread to still another portion of the Anglo-American world-Kentucky.
GEORGE RAGLAND, JR.

Machinery of Procedural Reform, 22 Michigan Law Review 243.

